Photo of Luke Taeschler

Luke is an experienced litigator and antitrust lawyer. He leverages his private practice and Federal Trade Commission experience to advise and represent clients on all aspects of antitrust law across a diverse range of industries. Luke’s varied practice covers class action litigation, competitor litigation, merger reviews and investigations, conduct investigations, and antitrust counseling. He represents clients spanning several industries, including the technology, healthcare, sports, pharmaceutical, financial services, automotive, and optical industries.

Prior to joining Crowell, Luke was an attorney with the FTC Bureau of Competition, where he investigated horizontal and vertical mergers as well as other business conduct. During his time at the FTC, Luke was one of the leading attorneys who investigated a large internet retailer’s proposed acquisition of iRobot and Navicent Health’s proposed acquisition of Houston Healthcare, both of which were abandoned. Most recently, Luke served as the lead attorney on a broad Section 2 investigation related to exclusive dealing, serial acquisitions, steering, rebating, and bundling. In addition to his antitrust experience, Luke litigates non-antitrust cases, including trade secrets, securities, and other complex commercial disputes.

Seeking to protect their investments in the face of increased liability management exercises, lenders began signing “cooperation agreements,” which required the lenders to cooperate when negotiating to restructure existing debt or provide new debt to their shared borrower. These cooperation agreements protect lenders from “creditor-on-creditor violence” — when one lender (or a subset of lenders) renegotiates with a borrower to the benefit of the negotiating lender and the detriment of the others.

In November 2025, Optimum Communications, Inc. (f/k/a Altice) and CSC Holdings, LLC (together, Optimum) filed a federal antitrust lawsuit against its lenders — Apollo, Ares, GoldenTree, Loomis, Oaktree, and PGIM (collectively, the Cooperative) — challenging their cooperation agreement as an unlawful cartel. In the complaint, Optimum alleges two antitrust theories: (i) the Cooperation Agreement constituted a group boycott of Optimum because the Cooperative members agreed not to individually work with Optimum to restructure debt absent supermajority approval from the Cooperative, and (ii) the Cooperation Agreement constituted an unlawful price-fixing scheme by requiring the Cooperative’s steering committee to negotiate with Optimum exclusively, rather than allow Optimum to negotiate individual discounts with individual lenders. Optimum alleges that because the Cooperative controls approximately 88% of the entire leveraged finance market and 99% of Optimum’s outstanding debt, the Cooperation Agreement has made it incredibly difficult for Optimum to restructure its debt.Continue Reading Optimum’s Shot Across the Bow: An Antitrust Challenge to Cooperation Agreements